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What is Justice? 
Christian Justice and Public Policy 
by Duncan B. Forrester 
Cambridge University Press (1997) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Poethics, Professor Richard Weisberg says, “Words create 
law . . . . They neither distort it nor stand in its way. Words do 
not translate the thought of justice, words are justice, and 
words can be the absence of justice.”1 This simplistic yet per-
spicacious metaphor equates the concept of justice with per-
haps the most basic form of communication—the expression of 
thought through the powerful word. This interpretation of jus-
tice would prove limiting to one’s self-enlightenment, as it 
metaphorically, and perhaps unknowingly, restricts the con-
cept of justice to something akin to a noun—an inanimate, life-
less thing, a word. Truly, the concept of justice cannot be fully 
realized nor understood unless it is analyzed in its purest form 
as an action or series of actions, a verb. Justice can exist only if 
it is done. Words alone cannot be justice; instead, justice is the 
implementation of those words for the betterment of those 
whom the words seek to serve. 
The most difficult task in determining how to categorize 
justice is defining the concept itself. What is justice, and how 
can one “do” justice? In our global society, the answer obviously 
varies among races, cultures, social classes, and genders. In 
Christian Justice and Public Policy,2 Duncan B. Forrester ad-
dresses that very question. He adds insight to the definition of 
justice by examining the role of Christian theology in our world 
and theology’s past and potential impact on public policy. For-
 
 1. RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS 6 (1992). 
 2. DUNCAN B. FORRESTER, CHRISTIAN JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997). 
LOP-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:17 PM 
934 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
rester’s analysis “is an attempt to explore the possibility that 
theology might have, even in a pluralist, secular society, a 
modest but constructive and questioning contribution to make 
both to the theoretical discussions which undergird policy and 
to policy-making itself.”3 In this Book Review, I will couple 
commentary on the role of Christian theology in our world to-
day with an analysis of the term “justice” in order to assess the 
actual need, if any, of a global exodus toward the tenets of 
Christianity in modern-day policymaking. This Book Review 
concludes that perhaps Christian theology, as Forrester be-
lieves, is the universal language that spans all cultures and 
classes and can normalize the varying interpretations of what 
justice is and how it is to be done. 
II.  THEOLOGY IN TODAY’S WORLD 
The role of Western Christian theology in today’s public 
sphere has diminished. The allure of the sciences and the wis-
dom of philosophy have arguably taken the place of the dictates 
of Christian faith. It is readily apparent that the application of 
Christian theory is at risk of becoming obsolete in the public fo-
rum of political decision-making. “The time is past when theol-
ogy can reign as queen of the sciences, putting each other voice 
in its place and articulating, with a conviction approaching  
certainty, the presuppositions all share. . . . [It] must take its 
place among the other voices, as often to be corrected as to  
correct.”4 
A.  The Need for Religion 
Forrester recognizes this trend in society—the hesitancy to 
view theology as anything other than religious folklore as op-
posed to a serious policymaking guidance. Religion, he asserts, 
has largely been relegated to the domestic and private realm. It 
is no longer expected to be of any real societal value, except in 
matters concerning morality and family issues.5 Additionally, 
Forrester asseverates that religion “has been domesticated and 
deprived of public relevance and is no longer capable of feeding 
into public discussion disturbing memories or distinctive in-
 
 3. Id. at 36. 
 4. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND 
THEIR DISCONTENTS 165 (1988). 
 5. See FORRESTER,  supra note 2, at 21. 
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sights into the human condition.”6 However, Forrester main-
tains that it is not only religious theory that is at risk of going 
the way of the dodo. The public forum, itself, is at risk of losing 
its efficiency. “There is increasing confusion and uncertainty 
about the bases for public policy. Some argue for a pragmatic 
ad-hoc approach; others seek a popular consensus around some 
theoretical core; others again appear to support any policy they 
believe likely to win votes.”7 
Despite these tendencies to devalue the importance of 
Christian thought in a policymaking forum, Forrester suggests 
that a return to theology is exactly what society needs to better 
understand the very issues it seeks to resolve. In formulating 
his hypothesis, Forrester does not suggest that the world has 
become a godless society. Rather, he merely recognizes that we 
as a global community have forgotten the potential importance, 
impact, and worth of implementing theology in our judicial and 
societal policies. If Forrester’s assertions prove true, then pub-
lic policy can directly impact and involve all those whom it gov-
erns by basing itself in a creed that teaches us to do justice 
unto others as we would have it done unto ourselves. 
In the legal community, the line dividing legal ethics and 
religious morality is often thin and separatory. However, For-
rester’s call to embrace the values of Christian theology more 
directly in our legal arena is not unique. This loss of religious 
wisdom has been recognized by others as a potential loss of so-
lutions to “the perennial questions of the moral life”—topics 
with which religion has “wrestled for thousands of years.”8 Spe-
cifically, it has been argued that religion “places a high value 
on self-sacrifice and reconciliation . . . and even [encourages us] 
to lay down [our] lives for each other. Christianity has some-
thing to say about the purposes of law and its limits, the duties 
owed to the secular state, and the relationship between justice 
and love.”9 Therefore, it seems that there is hardly a better way 
to procure effective public policy than by setting as one’s lode-
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 10. 
 8. Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on 
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1104 (1998) (discussing various 
ways in which the concept of legal ethics and legal practice is impoverished when relig-
ion is excluded from consideration in traditional lawyer-client relationships and other 
legal arenas). 
 9. Id. at 1104 (footnotes omitted). 
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star the altruistically (rather than economically) driven teach-
ings found in Christian theology. 
Unfortunately, the call for Christian theology made by For-
rester and others of like mind simply does not sufficiently ad-
dress the reality that the majority of our global population does 
not adhere to Christian dogma. We cannot, as an ecumenical 
society, “return” to Christian theology when most of Earth’s in-
habitants were never there. Muslim, Jew, and atheist alike 
would find troubling the implementation of the teachings of a 
foreign god as a matter of public policy. Forrester fails to pose 
an adequate solution to the difficulty that would surely accom-
pany such a quest for religious standardization on a global 
level. It is logical to assume, however, that Forrester is not 
necessarily advocating the conversion of the planet to Christi-
anity as such, but rather a return to the basic tenets of a moral 
code, compassion, and dignity that are the common threads of 
all theologies, from Christianity to Judaism, Ancestor Worship 
to Agnosticism. 
Truly, if one of the main reasons for creating public policies 
and forming laws is to administer justice to the greatest num-
ber of people, then perhaps it is wise to incorporate the teach-
ings encapsulated in theology. The laws, codes, and model rules 
that bind and obligate those engaged in the practice of law fo-
cus on the enforcement of the letter of the law. Obviously, the 
original intent in the creation of these rules may be a factor in 
law enforcement and interpretation but, unfortunately, there is 
no way of objectively knowing the intent of law and policymak-
ers who lived years ago. Use of theology would perhaps more 
fairly equip modern law and policymakers with the tools of ob-
jectivity and compassionate analytical ability so necessary for 
success. As one commentator has noted, 
rules provide no guidance for the lawyer who is grappling 
with questions that the rules themselves ignore—questions 
such as the ends of lawyering or the lawyer’s moral account-
ability for her actions. No rule can tell a lawyer if the rule it-
self should be obeyed. If we are to deal with these profound 
and fundamental questions, we need a more-encompassing 




 10. Id. at 1107-08. 
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 Therefore, theology can be a tool useful not only in the mak-
ing of rules, but in the understanding and the implementation 
of them, as well. 
B.  What is Justice? 
The ability to create and interpret legality and policy is of 
little or no worth if justice cannot be defined or at least under-
stood. Those with the power to formulate rules must, in es-
sence, exercise a mild form of omniscience. For justice to truly 
exist, the most good must be distributed to the greatest number 
of people, regardless of race, social class, or gender. Absent this 
principle, the people whom justice should serve are the very 
same people who will suffer the most. “[T]he most serious prob-
lem in this situation is not for the policy-makers, who are nor-
mally powerful and prosperous people with an assured position 
and a great deal of security, but for the poor and the weak.”11 
In actuality, the potential problem does not lie in formulat-
ing a dictionary definition of “justice,” but rather in establish-
ing a universal application of the term. As Forrester notes, 
[t]he problem is that too many people and groups have too 
many differing and often contradictory accounts of justice. 
Too many people think that they know what justice is, and 
usually they understand justice in a way that suits their indi-
vidual or collective interests. In such a context we have not so 
much a vacuum as an arena, or even a battlefield.12 
Throughout the world, definitions of justice vary according 
to culture and life experiences. Surely, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the notions of justice for an impoverished, single-
parent African-American or Latino living in an inner-city 
ghetto are quite different from the justice imagined by an up-
per-class family. The notion of what societal norms are fair and 
equitable would surely differ between a resident of a black 
township of Johannesburg and a white resident living within 
city limits. As a result of hardships, advantages, disadvan-
tages, and a multitude of other factors, it is apparent that peo-
ple have polarized themselves into social groups that would 
each view equity and justice differently. 
Ideas of justice are wrought into weapons to be used in social 
 
 11. FORRESTER, supra note 2, at 40. 
 12. Id. at 40-41. 
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conflict; each side claims that their case is just; and there is 
no arbitrator or judge to resolve the matter. . . . What has 
been lost is a sense of the objectivity of justice, that justice is 
grounded in reality, not simply something we devise and use 
for our purposes.13 
The “battlefield” of which Forrester speaks is evident in to-
day’s society.14 Differing political and special interest groups 
compete in the legislature and in other institutions of govern-
ment, demanding that their concerns be heard and given spe-
cial importance. Each group, although at times diametrically 
opposed to the others, believes itself to be right. Each bases 
that assumption on the collective experiences of the group. 
Which group’s experiences are most valid? Which concept of 
justice is the correct approach? 
For Forrester, the great equalizer can be Christian theol-
ogy. Christian edicts do not discriminate among race, color, or 
nationality. Christian policy does not segregate based upon so-
cioeconomic background. Policies embracing Christian tenets 
are likely to foster a more unilateral administration of fairness 
because they do not distinguish people into classes and groups 
but treat all as peers. The battleground becomes common 
ground, and legal policymaking takes a step towards truer jus-
tice for a greater mass of people. Perhaps intentionally, Forres-
ter does not proffer any specific formula for the formation or 
the implementation of such Christian-influenced policies on a 
global scale, only the hope that theology will lead to justice. In-
deed, it is difficult to imagine a practical method through which 
the policymaking process could modify itself to more wholly in-
corporate theology. 
Realistically, the feasibility of accepting the Christian ide-
als of which the author speaks cannot be genuinely discovered 
until well after we begin to implement them. However, as For-
rester explains, for believers, such a hope in theology “pre-
sent[s] an open future, full of possibilities; and thus [it] can mo-
tivate and sustain great movements of change. [It] can support 
people through times of oppression and suffering, and enable 
them to struggle for justice with pertinacity.”15 
 
 13. Id. at 41. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 248. 
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III.  POLICIES AND THEORIES 
As previously discussed, the concept of justice can be as ab-
stract as it is concrete. Definitions and interpretations will 
vary. However, justice, no matter how defined, always mani-
fests itself through many diverse facets of daily living. Exam-
ples of various interpretations of justice can be seen both in 
laws and policies themselves or in the manner through which 
these rules are enforced and upheld. Forrester focuses on sev-
eral of these policies and theories, attempting to identify prob-
lems that may arise “when there is a fundamental uncertainty 
about whether an objective standard of justice exists, when 
there is a moral vacuum.”16 
For example, Forrester explores his notion of an objective 
standard of justice as it relates to the concept of imprisonment. 
The role of a prison can range from punishment to retribution, 
from rehabilitation to permanent confinement. Policymakers 
view the role of prisons differently than do the prisoners that 
occupy those institutions. 
Prisons are major social institutions, key components in any 
modern system of criminal justice, and they are expected to be 
agencies of justice on behalf of society. Various understand-
ings of criminal justice and of social justice are expressed in 
policies and practices of imprisonment. Yet at times when 
there is much uncertainty and confusion about what justice 
is, people become unclear what prisons are for, what they are 
intended to achieve and how they should operate.17 
If a prison is to be successful in fulfilling its overall pur-
pose, the prison must have a purpose for both those on the out-
side and those on the inside of its walls. From an outside per-
spective, a prison seems to personify justice—admission costs 
only the price of a crime, and those who occupy prisons have all 
been judged to have paid the full price of admission. However, 
little justice is being served if the prisoner is not changing or at 
least seeing a need for reform. Forrester talks of Scottish pris-
ons in which “the prisoners’ view was of a system that was of-
ten dehumanising and sometimes brutal, and in countless ways 
made people worse rather than better, less likely to become 
useful, law-abiding citizens, and more incapable of reintegrat-
 
 16. Id. at 61. 
 17. Id. at 63. 
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ing effectively into society at the end of their sentence.”18 If the 
inmate sees no real purpose in confinement, “prisons tend to 
become human warehouses.”19 No rehabilitation occurs—only 
growing resentment; the prisoner is not guided towards a 
change in behavior and attitude, and society is robbed of the 
chance to have a productive member reenter. In short, justice is 
not served. 
Forrester queries, “If we are all offenders, how dare we 
judge?”20 He suggests that a Christian understanding of the 
principles behind imprisonment may lead to a better imple-
mentation of those principles. A mixture of discipline and for-
giveness may lead to a justly reformed offender. He explains, 
“Discipline is not properly to be understood primarily as regi-
mentation or the infliction of pain. It is rather the maintenance 
and restoration of the structure of relationships, allowing peo-
ple to grow and develop together.”21 Moreover, in a society that 
is based upon Christian theology, “[f]orgiveness is offered freely 
and is to be received with joy and responded to in life. But for-
giveness is not cheap and does not lead to a turning of the blind 
eye to the gravity of offence—indeed, precisely the opposite.”22 
Forrester out-lines the ideal impact of theology on both policy-
makers and communities when dealing with public offenders: 
[They] should respond both with punishment and redemption, 
indeed with punishment which is oriented towards redemp-
tion. Offenders were not to be shown to be different, but to ex-
emplify the human condition. The offender retained always 
an ‘intimate link’ with the community. Even if the offender 
was for a while to be excluded from the community, the goal 
was reconciliation and reception back after repentance and 
forgiveness.23 
Forrester does not assert that Christian theology ultimately le-
gitimizes the current penal system, but that, through a better 
implementation of the tenets of theology, the penal system can 
provide the “support and encouragement as well as stimulus 
and perhaps guidance”24 to those who need it most. 
 
 18. Id. at 64. 
 19. Id. at 68. 
 20. Id. at 77. 
 21. Id. at 81. 
 22. Id. at 78. 
 23. Id. at 79. 
 24. Id. at 84. 
LOP-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:17 PM 
933] BOOK REVIEW: CHRISTIAN JUSTICE 941 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
When postulating, one can only hope that these concepts of 
justice prove to be effective in achieving their purpose. Forres-
ter’s bold mandate for an implementation of theology into poli-
cymaking is not only accurate, but long overdue. Our society is 
faced with a sort of legal cynicism—a withering hope that jus-
tice will prevail in light of many possible interpretations and 
applications of policies and laws. Race, gender, economics, and 
social class will all shape each individual’s hope in our system 
of justice. Forrester claims that “[a] society without vision is 
petty, selfish and cruel.”25 He also reminds us that “[h]ope is 
inescapably a way of envisioning the future. Theology’s concern 
with vision and with hope reminds us that it does not deal only 
with particular problems and policies and ethical conundrums, 
any more than it is concerned exclusively for the past or with 
the present.”26 Forrester accurately challenges us all to ask 
ourselves perhaps the simplest question regarding our inter-
pretation of justice: “Above all, does it challenge and enable us 
to do justice, and to love kindness and to walk humbly with our 
God?”27 As we keep examining, defining, and redefining our so-
cietal concepts of justice, we inevitably grow closer to the day in 
which we will arrive at the answer to the question, “What is 
justice?” Perhaps the return to Christian theology is the cata-
lyst that will take us to that day. 
Michael David Lopez 
 
 25. Id. at 259. 
 26. Id. at 258. 
 27. Id. at 259. 
